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Abstract
The commercial airframe industry in the US experienced a shakeout from the early 1930s into the post‐Second
World War period. Unlike shakeouts in automobiles, tyres, or televisions, the commercial airframe industry's
early life cycle was affected by external factors, particularly government demand. Using newly digitized data on
all planes introduced in the commercial market between 1926 and 1965, we find that commercial airframe
manufacturers with bomber contracts during the Second World War were more likely to have postwar market
share than firms without such contracts, controlling for plane characteristics and other forms of government
contracting. We attribute the effect of bomber contracts to advantages in R&D learning capacity acquired by
firms with military airframe contracts. Despite low (or zero) initial presence in the commercial market, these
learning capacity advantages allowed such firms to survive the early period of the shakeout, and later to thrive.

In a freely competitive economy the number of companies manufacturing a particular product levels off
at a point determined by the ordinary laws of economics. In the case of the aircraft industry, however, it
would be dangerous to rely only on the operation of these laws.
Aircraft yearbook, 1948[7]
The life cycle of many industries displays a distinctive pattern of entry and exit. In the past three decades, a
theoretical literature has emerged to explain this pattern in terms of selection, spending on R&D, and the
technological adoption decisions of individual firms.[8] Empirically, this appears to be consistent with the
experience of a wide range of industries.[9] However, in many cases, the details of an industry's evolution are
shaped by geography, institutions, or historical accident.[10]
The existing literature emphasizes the coevolution of technology and market structure in the standard story of
an industry's rise and convergence to long‐run equilibrium. Over the industry life cycle, firms that fail to earn
positive profits exit and output is reallocated to new arrivals and incumbents. In the early stages, many firms
earn profits and entry outpaces exit, which causes the number of firms to increase and the industry to expand.
In later stages, as profit opportunities become scarcer, failures outnumber entrants, and survivors are
disproportionately high productivity firms with large output. Market forces alone produce an industry's market
structure. While the stylized facts of many industries fit within this framework, the historical evolution of some
industries relies on institutional details that are not currently emphasized by the standard theory.
In this article, we examine the role of government demand in the early commercial airframe industry. We start
by showing how the standard model of industry shakeout due to Klepper can be modified and, in conjunction
with commercial airframe history, used to understand the industry's evolution to long‐run equilibrium. In
particular, we interpret the military airframe market as an avenue for acquiring experience both prior to, and
concurrently with, entry into the commercial airframe market.[11] In the theory, experience yields a productivity
advantage that allows entrants, even late entrants, to survive and thrive despite low initial market share. We
use newly digitized data on market share for all commercial airframe manufacturers from 1926 to 1965 to
examine the role of government demand. The data also include detailed information on plane characteristics,
which allow us to control for differences in performance due to technological progress and the idiosyncratic
R&D capabilities of individual firms.
The results suggest that in the commercial airframe industry, the standard story of shakeout should be
augmented to include a role for government demand and regulation. We focus on the role of government
demand through Air Mail and military contracts from the interwar period to the 1940s, and provide evidence
that the impact of government demand on shakeout was twofold. First, in the industry's infancy during the
1930s, certain manufacturers held Air Mail and military contracts. This allowed some firms to survive periods of
low (even zero) market share on the commercial side of their businesses. Second, the rapid growth in demand
for military aircraft during the Second World War allowed a select group of firms to increase their R&D learning
capacity, that is, their ability to assimilate and exploit technological knowledge in aviation. As the jet engine age
dawned in the postwar period, these learning capacity differentials set the stage for the market's eventual
evolution to duopoly.
Ultimately, we show that the government played an important role in determining the identity of the industry's
participants after 1945. These insights augment the standard account of shakeout in markets with strong
civilian‐driven demand (for example, automobiles, tyres, and television) and are crucial for identifying the
determinants of industry evolution when the role of government is large (for example, aircraft, aluminum,
penicillin, and rubber). In addition, by examining the role of the Second World War in shaping the commercial

airframe industry's postwar market structure, we contribute to a long‐standing debate about the role of the war
in the development of the American economy in the postwar period.[12]
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section provides an overview of the early commercial
airframe industry, emphasizing similarities and differences relative to the shakeouts in other industries. In
section, we review the relevant theoretical argument and relate the model of shakeout presented by Klepper to
the details of the early commercial airframe industry. Section III draws on archival and secondary sources to
highlight the effect of government contracting and to explain the atypical features of the industry's evolution to
its long‐run equilibrium. To support the argument presented in section III, section presents empirical analysis
that examines the effect of government contracting on the postwar success of commercial airframe
manufacturers. Section V synthesizes the theory, history, and empirical results, and section concludes.

Overview of the commercial airframe shakeout
The conventional view of industry shakeout is based on two related observations: the pattern of entry and exit,
and the evolution of market concentration. The time series of the total number of firms, entry, and exit is shown
in panel A of figure for the commercial airframe industry from 1926 to 1965. The number of firms increased
from the mid‐to‐late 1920s and peaked in 1929.[13] Consistent with the standard story, Rae observes that ‘the
big [airframe] companies were not in an oligopolistic position in 1929’, at the beginning of the industry's
shakeout.[14] Starting in 1930, the number of existing firms decreased sharply. After the Second World War, a
much smaller decrease occurred, and by the mid‐1950s the number of firms in the industry was roughly
constant until the end of our sample period in 1965.
The macroeconomic turmoil of the early 1930s adversely affected the survival of commercial airframe firms. But
if Depression‐era demand was the main reason for the industry's evolution, we should see a decrease in airline
passenger traffic following the 1929 stock market crash. Instead, panel B shows that the number of airline
passengers increased in the early 1930s and then again after 1934. Mowery and Rosenberg note, ‘Even in the
midst of the depression, airline traffic boomed’.[15] The data suggest that the microeconomic details of the
commercial airframe industry's technology and market structure were crucial determinants of entry and exit.
Figure 1. Stylized facts of the commercial airframe shakeout (a) Firms, entry, and exit. (b) No. of passengers. (c)
Market concentration (d) New planes by usage.

Notes: Panel A shows the no. of commercial airframe firms (US and foreign), entrants, and exits on time. Panel B shows the
no. of airline passengers in the prewar period. Panel C shows commercial airframe market concentration on time. The

vertical lines indicate the release dates of major Douglas Aircraft planes. Panel D shows the moving average of new
commercial planes, both used and unused, on time.
Source: Phillips, Technology and market structure; Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America,
Aircraft yearbook.

The second stylized fact of shakeout is that the industry becomes more concentrated over time. Panel C shows
the Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index for the addition of planes to airlines from 1933 to 1965. The rapid increase in
concentration before the war is consistent with the conventional view of shakeout. During this period, Douglas
Aircraft dominated the commercial market with the DC‐3; from its introduction in 1936 to 1941, the DC‐3
accounted for over 80 per cent of all new aircraft put in service by airlines.[16] The DC‐3 was so successful
because it dramatically reduced operating costs for airlines. According to Sutton, ‘No aircraft, before or since,
has cut unit operating costs so sharply’.[17]
The industry's postwar trajectory is surprising in view of this prewar growth in concentration. Panel D shows the
five‐year moving average for the number of new commercial airframe models, broken down by whether the
new plane was put in service by an airline or not. Shakeout theory predicts that entry dwindles as market
concentration increases because potential entrants cannot profitably enter and compete with high‐volume,
cost‐efficient incumbents. Yet in the early commercial airframe industry, despite rising market concentration,
the number of unsuccessful planes exceeded the number of successful ones throughout the 1930s, and this
trend was not reversed until the mid‐1950s.
Moreover, firms that have little or no market share for an extended period should exit during a shakeout, but
this did not occur in the commercial airframe industry in several notable cases. Consolidated‐Vultee Aircraft
(Convair) and its predecessor firms did not introduce a successful commercial aircraft from 1931 to 1947. During
this period, Convair's average yearly market share was 0.5 per cent, yet the company enjoyed an average market
share of 18.8 per cent from 1947 to 1964. Similarly, Boeing Aircraft did not have significant commercial market
share during a 25‐year period (averaging 4.3 per cent) before finally gaining prominence with its 707 model in
1959. These experiences are in stark contrast to firms in the infant automotive industry. Early entrants and
once‐prominent automakers simply disappeared and did not enjoy the later life cycle successes of Boeing and
Convair.
The stylized facts suggest a commercial airframe shakeout beginning in 1929 and, on one hand, the shakeout
appears typical. There was a sharp drop in the number of firms immediately after 1929, and market
concentration increased throughout the 1930s. On the other hand, there is evidence that the commercial
airframe shakeout was unusual. Firms that survived the shakeout were almost exclusively part of one of a
handful of holding companies (see section III), the number of planes introduced and adopted did not exceed the
number of planes introduced but never used until the mid‐1950s, and several firms experienced strong market
gains after years of zero or near‐zero market share.
One factor that affected shakeout in the commercial airframe industry that was not present in other shakeout
episodes was strong military demand. Phillips writes: ‘[T]he decrease in numbers would likely have been greater
and the possibility of entry by new producers would likely have been much less had there not been huge
procurement of military aircraft and related R and D through much of the period’.[18] In their infancy, for
example, the automobile, tyre, and television industries all had much stronger civilian demand and never
experienced government demand that was as substantial as in the commercial airframe industry.

Shakeout theory
In this section we illustrate the potential effects of government demand on the commercial airframe market
using Klepper's shakeout model.[19] The model assumes 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 potential entrants in each period. An entrant 𝑖𝑖
chooses quantity (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and R&D expenditure (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) to maximize profits given by:

∏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔 (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )] 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑚𝑚(∆ 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) (1)

where 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the market price common to all firms, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 denotes a cost component common to all firms, and
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) is the reduction in average cost due to R&D expenditure. Firm 𝑖𝑖 enters the market in period 𝑡𝑡 if ∏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥
0. So long as profits are weakly positive, the firm remains in the market. If ∏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 0 in any period, the firm exits
the market permanently.

Following entry decisions, firms incur a cost shock, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, which is independent and identically distributed
across firms and periods. This captures random variation in costs due, for example, to management practices.
Thus, average costs are given by 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Firm‐specific R&D productivity, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , is fixed over time
and can take either value 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 or 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 , with 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 > 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 . To capture diminishing returns to R&D expenditures, 𝑔𝑔/ >
0 and 𝑔𝑔// < 0. To ensure that even low productivity (𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 ) firms attempt at least some cost innovation,
𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 / (0)𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 > 1. At the end of each period, all firms costlessly imitate the last period's lowest cost, so 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 =
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 – max{𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )}. Finally, there are costs associated with changing capacity, 𝑚𝑚(∆ 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), where and ∆ 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 and for all output choices.
In the model, shakeout is driven by heterogeneity in firms’ ability to translate R&D expenditures into lower
average costs. Over time, more productive firms expand their output and 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 decreases. This determines
the profitability of new entrants and the survival of firms currently in the market. The first‐order conditions for
quantity (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and R&D expenditures ((𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )), respectively, are given by:

𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑚𝑚/ (∆ 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔/(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1

The first expression equates the marginal benefit of expanding output with its marginal cost. Because firms with
𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 > 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 require less R&D expenditure for a given marginal cost of expanding output, they are more likely than
firms with 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 to earn non‐negative profit, and thus are more likely to enter the market and to survive. The
second expression equates the marginal benefit of R&D with its marginal cost. Because 𝑔𝑔/ is decreasing in 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
firms with the same 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 but greater 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 attempt more R&D.

Figure 2. Model simulation results (a) Baseline R&D learning capacity. (b) High R&D learning capacity.
Notes: Panel A graphs the average firm survival percentage in 100 computer simulations of Klepper on firm age. The
parameters used for panel A are used for the panel B simulations, except half of the ‘later entry cohort’ in panel B have high
R&D productivity as described in the text.

To use the model to understand the role of government demand in the commercial airframe shakeout, we start
by connecting its specific features to the determinants of the evolution of the commercial airframe industry.
First, as can be seen from equation , a commercial airframe manufacturer that charges a high price for a plane
increases their profit and thus their probability of survival. Unfortunately detailed data on prices for different
aircraft over time are unavailable. Instead, our empirical analysis focuses on the commercial market share for
the universe of manufacturers and controls for an extensive set of plane characteristics that adjust for
differences that translate into differential abilities of firms to exercise market power.
The model assumes a cost component, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 , common to all firms. In each period, existing entrants and potential
new entrants can costlessly imitate the lowest cost from the previous period. In this section, we maintain this
cost spillover assumption. In appendix I, we drop the assumption to allow for learning‐by‐doing and learning‐by‐
using which are important phenomena in the airframe industry. To capture differences in costs of changing
productive scale across firms, firm‐specific 𝑚𝑚(·) functions can also be included.

The model captures firm‐specific differences in R&D productivity through 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 . Additional differences in R&D
productivity can be incorporated through firm‐specific 𝑔𝑔(·) functions. Cost innovation productivity differences
may arise if manufacturers with experience producing airframes prior to, or concurrently with, entry into the
commercial market (for example, military or cargo) are more efficient at cost innovation. The coefficient 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and
the function 𝑔𝑔(·) can be interpreted as capturing a firm's learning capacity, or its ability to assimilate and exploit
technological knowledge.[20] All else being equal, firms with more learning capacity require less R&D
expenditure to lower their average costs.
In the model, when both earlier and later market entrants have the same distribution of R&D productivity
coefficients, earlier entrants have higher survival rates. To illustrate this, we simulate equation one hundred
times under the assumptions outlined above. Panel A of figure shows the average cumulative survival
percentage of the simulations when cost shocks are randomly drawn and firms are randomly assigned R&D
productivity coefficients of either 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 or 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 , with 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 > 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 . The black line is the average cumulative survival for
an earlier‐entering cohort; the grey line is for a later‐entering cohort.

Section I notes that Boeing and Convair had small commercial airframe market shares for several years before
finally breaking through after the Second World War. In terms of the shakeout model, we are interested in
whether the survival probability changes if a subset of later entrants have high R&D productivity. Panel B of
figure shows the average cumulative survival percentage of one hundred simulations using the same random
assignment of cost shocks as in panel A. The random assignment of R&D productivity coefficients is also the
same as in panel A with one exception: half of the later entry cohort are given R&D coefficients of 𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 , where
𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 > 𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 > 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 . Again, the black line is for the earlier entry cohort and the grey line is for the later entry cohort.
When half of the later‐entering cohort have a relatively high R&D coefficient, their own cohort's survival
probability increases. However, the survival probability of the earlier cohort is unaffected when the later
entrants have higher learning capacity (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 ). In appendix I, we report simulations with the cost spillover
assumption relaxed. The survival probability of the earlier entry cohort falls in these additional simulations. The
next section shows how key features of the model can be understood in the historical context of the early
commercial airframe industry.

Specifics of the commercial airframe shakeout
This section draws on airframe industry history to highlight the determinants of the commercial airframe
shakeout. In addition to considering the crucial role of government demand throughout the 1930s and 1940s,
we survey other drivers of the industry's evolution, such as integration through holding companies.

Holding companies
Following a large expansion in aircraft production during the First World War, the market for airframes collapsed
and remained small throughout the 1920s; airlines carried fewer than 10,000 revenue‐passengers per year prior
to 1928. In addition, demand from military contracts was almost completely absent. In the face of this
uncertainty, market participants were reluctant to expand. Starting in the 1930s passenger traffic increased
substantially and the number of commercial airframe manufacturers peaked, among them postwar industry
leaders such as Boeing and Lockheed.
Prior to the stock market crash in October 1929, many airframe manufacturers organized under one of several
holding companies. Under this form of business organization, stock of subsidiary companies was exchanged for
stock in the parent company.[21] These affiliations potentially affected access to working capital, and thus the
probability of firm survival. In particular, manufacturers obtained working capital predominantly from retained
earnings or equity.[22] Holding companies that coupled commercial airframe makers with other aviation firms
may have increased commercial airframe firms’ probability of survival through cross‐subsidization or by
increasing revenue from stock issues.
For example, figure shows a time series of working capital for several major holding companies and the
independent Douglas. William Boeing's United Air & Transport was the most integrated holding company with
strong subsidiaries in engines and parts, commercial and military airframes, and airlines.[ 23] Curtiss‐Wright also
had strong military sales from its engine and aircraft subsidiaries. Aviation Corporation had two aircraft
subsidiaries but focused on the transport of mail, passengers, and freight, and had no notable military sales.

Figure 3. Working capital, by holding company
Notes: This figure shows working capital (current assets minus current liabilities) from Dec. 1928 to Dec. 1933 for several
major holding companies and one independent firm, Douglas Aircraft. The holding companies were disbanded by the Air
Mail Act in June 1934. The dashed vertical line indicates the ‘Black Tuesday’ stock market crash of Oct. 1929.
Source: Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s manual of industrials.

Both Detroit Aircraft and Douglas had similar levels of working capital. Detroit's explicit goal was to become the
General Motors of aviation. Through conscious choices by its founders, the company had little access to
government demand; it had no subsidiary airlines with Air Mail revenue and manufactured no military planes in
quantity. On the other hand, 91 per cent of Douglas's plane sales went to the military during this period. Thus,
although holding company affiliation may have aided survival, it was not decisive. The composition of holding
companies mattered.
When the Air Mail Act of 1934 forcibly separated airframe manufacturers from airlines, quasi‐vertical integration
via holding companies was ended and revenues from Air Mail disappeared. At this point, government demand
through military contracts became increasingly important. In the empirical analysis, we control for holding
company affiliation and examine the relationship between access to government contracts and success in the
postwar commercial market.

Dominant designs, patents, and innovation spillovers
The rise in concentration in the late 1930s was driven by one plane: the Douglas DC‐3 (see panel C of figure 1).
Introduced in 1936, the DC‐3 synthesized previous technological innovations to such an extent that airlines were
forced to buy it, or one of its imitators. Following the introduction of this plane, one‐time commercial leaders
such as Fairchild, Ford, Fokker, and Stinson either were acquired, exited the commercial market, or shuttered
completely. The DC‐3 thus fits the definition of a dominant design as discussed by Utterback and Suarez.[24]
While the DC‐3 was undoubtedly revolutionary in lowering operating costs for the airlines, it did not embody
technology that unilaterally ‘triggered’ the industry's shakeout. The number of firms in the commercial airframe
market peaked prior to Douglas's entry. Moreover, despite the increase in market concentration in the 1930s
shown in panel C of figure 1, the number of firms remained relatively constant as shown in panel A of figure 1.
The development of the DC‐3 illustrates the scattered nature of technological advance in the pre‐Second World
War period. It was derived from Douglas's earlier DC‐2 and DC‐1 planes. In turn, the DC‐1 drew technology from
Boeing's 247 and from Northrop Corporation's Alpha and Gamma commercial planes. Boeing had drawn on prior
experience with their B‐9 bomber for the 247. In turn, the B‐9 drew on the 221, a commercial plane. Phillips
concludes that ‘unlike the post‐World War II period … it cannot with generality be contended that military
aircraft were antecedent to commercial planes of the same general performance and technical
characteristics’.[25]
From 1917 to 1975, the airframe industry enjoyed a series of patent cross‐licensing agreements under the
auspices of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA).[ 26] The patents of each MAA member were available
to every other member. As a result, unlike Alcoa's early dominance in aluminium, the evolution of the early
commercial airframe industry is not explained by the patent protection of a dominant design.
The shakeout may have been affected by design spillovers within multi‐market airframe firms. Companies that
designed military airframes or flying boats in addition to commercial airframes may have had an advantage
relative to firms that only produced commercial, land‐type planes. Smith argues that flying boats embodied
major aeronautical advances.[27] The leaders in the field were Sikorsky, Martin, and Boeing. At the same time
that typical land‐type planes had two engines and weighed less than 30,000 pounds, typical flying boats had four
engines and weighed over 50,000 pounds. For the empirical analysis, we use detailed information on plane
characteristics to separate the importance of specific design attributes from the contribution of government
demand.

Technological change and scale economies
It is possible that airframe manufacturers who produced both commercial and military planes had scale
economies advantages over commercial‐only producers. Scale advantages are a key determinant of survival in
the model presented in section II. However, an implicit assumption of the model is that technology is relatively
fixed.
The pace of technological change in the airframe market in the 1930s has been described as ‘violent’ by
Holley.[28] Unlike airframe firms, aircraft engine makers could mass‐produce and the market was essentially a
duopoly between Curtiss‐Wright and Pratt‐Whitney. The contrast between airframe and aircraft engine
manufacturers in the mid‐1930s is instructive:
The engine manufacturers are on firmer economic ground than the airplane manufacturers. The former
are more nearly manufacturers in the true sense, with a fairly steady market for a relatively slowly
changing product. The latter are really contractors, offering a product that is constantly changing which
seldom affords them opportunity to settle down and manufacture steadily and efficiently.[29]
In such a market, airframe manufacturers could not expand output up to the point at which their marginal profit
from doing so vanished.
Indeed, because technology was changing so rapidly, civil aircraft average unit costs increased from $4,854 in
1928 to $8,413 in 1937.[30] Military aircraft average unit costs, driven by military performance requirements,
were greater in magnitude and rose even more over the same period. In the commercial airframe market, panel
D of figure indicates that the expected return for new commercial planes was not low enough to dissuade plane
makers from sinking costs into developing (often unsuccessful) planes throughout the 1930s.[ =31]

Government contracts
Government contracting with commercial airframe firms took two forms: Air Mail contracts and military
airframe contracts. Commercial airframe manufacturers with Air Mail contracts potentially enjoyed a survival
advantage over their competitors without such contracts. For example, while Boeing Aircraft was part of the
United Air & Transport holding company with United Air Lines, Bellanca Aircraft had no similar relationship with
an Air Mail carrier. However, any cross‐subsidization that may have aided survival in the commercial airframe
market was short‐lived; the Air Mail Act of 1934 forcibly separated airline and airframe firms. In our empirical
analysis, we account for firms who were part of a holding company with Air Mail revenue.
It is possible that producing certain types of military planes before and during the Second World War gave some
firms an advantage in the commercial airframe market at the end of the war. Planes procured in the era
included light bombers (with an A‐ designation), medium and heavy bombers (B‐), transports (C‐), and fighters
(P‐). Of these, the B‐ and C‐designated planes were the most similar to commercial airframes. Eight airframe
manufacturers produced large bombers with a B‐designation. Of these, three firms (Bell, Ford, and North
American) did not attempt to enter the commercial airframe industry after the war. The other five (Boeing,
Convair—formerly Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, and Martin) were the only firms with a positive share in the
commercial market from 1946 until 1955 (when Vickers‐Armstrong entered with its 770 plane).
The development of the heavy bombers used by the US in the Second World War began in the second half of the
1930s. In the fall of 1935, the Boeing 299 beat Douglas and Martin aircraft for a military contract. This airframe
eventually became the B‐17, of which 12,692 were produced during the war.[32] The other large bombers with
substantial wartime production were Consolidated's B‐24 (18,190 produced), North American's B‐25 (9,816),
Martin's B‐26 (5,157), and Boeing's B‐29 (3,898). Douglas did not design any of these, but was a competitor for
each contract.[33] In addition to the five firms just mentioned, the set of serious competitors for the contracts

included Lockheed. In Britain, Vickers (later Vickers‐Armstrong) designed the Wellington bomber, of which
11,461 were manufactured.
Transports were also large, commercial‐like military planes. In fact, they were modified directly from existing
commercial planes. They included the C‐45 made from Beech's Beechcraft 18, the C‐46 made from Curtiss‐
Wright's CW‐20, the C‐47 from Douglas's DC‐3, the C‐54 from Douglas's DC‐4, and the C‐60 from Lockheed's L‐
18. Other transport manufacturers included Fairchild, Cesna, Convair, and Lockheed. Because transports were
modified versions of existing commercial airframes, their effect on the postwar market was minimal. In our
empirical analysis, we test for potential spillovers from military airframe production to postwar commercial
success.

Empirics of the commercial airframe shakeout
The previous section proposes several hypotheses that we test using information on the planes introduced to
the commercial market between 1926 and 1965 drawn from Phillips.[34] For each plane the data include
information on whether and when it was adopted for use in the commercial market, the market share, and
additional characteristics, such as the number of engines and seats, speed, and range. A particularly useful
feature of these data is that they provide the universe of all planes that could have possibly been used in the
commercial market and indicate which planes were actually used in said market. In sum, the dataset contains
118 planes produced by 49 manufacturers.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for planes used in the empirical analysis. Panel A summarizes the
characteristics of all planes; panels B and C stratify the sample by planes adopted and not adopted by the
commercial market, respectively. In general, the patterns in the table are as expected. Planes adopted in the
commercial market tended to be more powerful (for example, 9,625 versus 2,711 horsepower), larger (37 versus
21 passengers), and faster (258 versus 167 miles per hour). We include these characteristics in the empirical
analysis to control for the role of specific design features in the postwar presence and market share of these
planes.
Table 1. Summary statistics for plane characteristics
Panel A:
All
Mean Min.
Max.
Mean
Entry year
1938
1926
1965
1941
Speed
212.3 95
610
258.1
Capacity
28.32 4
216
36.98
Engines
2.18
1
8
2.41
Engine type
0.9
0
1
0.78
Power
6,018 200
72,000 9,625
Load
12.23 7.3
20.3
11.49
Range
1,413 420
6,300 1,469
Service
22,590 2,000
41,000 24,430
Climb
1,180 650
2,460 1,247
Observations
118

Panel B:
Used
Min.
1926
95
4
1
0
300
7.3
420
2,000
675
56

Panel C: Not
used
Max.
Mean Min.
1965
1936
1927
610
167.2 102
142
20.52 5
4
1.97
1
1
1.00
0
72,000 2,711 200
14.5
12.77 8.2
6,000 1,348 450
41,000 20,180 12,000
2,460 863.1 650
62

Max.
1958
400
216
8
1
30,000
20.3
6,300
41,000
1,695

Notes: Panel A contains all models; panels B and C, respectively, stratify by whether a plane was adopted and not adopted
by the commercial market. The variables in the table are the year a plane entered domestic service (panel B) or the year a
plane became available (panel C), no. of engines, engine type (piston equal to 1 and turbo‐prop, turbo‐jet, and turbo‐fan
equal to 0), maximum power at take‐off, typical passenger capacity, gross weight in pounds per horsepower or load, typical
cruising speed, full load cruise range, service ceiling (in feet), and initial climb rate (in feet per minute), respectively, in the
rows.

Source: Phillips, Technology and market structure.

Our main interest lies in quantifying the postwar impact of prewar and war‐related relationships with the
government through contracts for Air Mail and military airframes. We measure these relationships using
indicator variables for whether the firm producing each plane had contracts to deliver Air Mail, contracts to
deliver planes of all types to the Army or Navy in the 1930s, and contracts to produce the B‐series bomber
during the Second World War.[35] Because the historical record highlights the importance of holding companies,
we include holding company affiliation in our analysis. For outcomes, we focus on market presence and market
share in the postwar period. We are primarily interested in whether access to government contracts delayed the
shakeout of some firms and allowed others to continue production despite low initial market share.
Table 2 shows the relationship between the variables we use to capture access to government contracts and
success in postwar markets. Panel A shows that of all planes introduced between 1926 and 1965, 21.2 per cent
were produced by firms with some presence in postwar markets. Panel B gives the share of planes
manufactured by firms with a postwar presence, stratified by whether the firm had any type of government
contract (that is, Air Mail, Army/Navy, or bomber). Of these, 31.0 per cent were present in the postwar market,
compared with 6.4 per cent that received no government contract. The entries in panel C show that the
difference apparent in panel B is driven by access to Army/Navy and bomber contracts; Air Mail contracts
appear unimportant for postwar market presence.
Table 2 Summary statistics for postwar market presence
Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Panel A
All
118 0.212 0.410
Panel B
Any contract
Yes
71
0.310 0.466
No
47
0.064 0.247
Panel C
Air Mail
Yes
23
0.217 0.422
No
95
0.211 0.410
Army/Navy
Yes
56
0.357 0.483
No
61
0.080 0.275
Bomber
Yes
44
0.500 0.506
No
74
0.041 0.199

Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the share of all planes introduced between 1926 and 1965 with postwar
market share (panel A), stratified by whether the firm had any type of government contract (panel B), and specific types of
contracts including Air Mail, Army/Navy, and Second World War bomber contracts (panel C).

To examine further the impact of prewar and wartime relationships with the government, we estimate the
following specification:

𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼1 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎/𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼4 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗 +
𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗

(2)

where 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 is an indicator for whether plane 𝑗𝑗 had positive market share in the postwar period (1946–65). The first
three variables on the right‐hand side of equation are indicators equal to one if the firm producing 𝑗𝑗 had
bomber, Army/Navy, or Air Mail contracts, respectively. The variable ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗 is an indicator for whether plane
𝑗𝑗 was produced by a firm belonging to a holding company prior to 1934. The vector of plane characteristics, 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,
adjusts for the role of the design features given in table 1. Multidimensional clustering is used to adjust standard
errors for both within‐firm as well as within‐year‐of‐entry correlations of the residuals.[ 36]
The results of estimating equation (2) are shown in table 3. Column 1 includes only the variables associated with
our main hypotheses from section III, column 2 adds controls for speed and capacity, and column 3 includes
additional controls for number of engines, engine type, maximum power at take‐off, gross weight pounds per
horsepower or load, full load cruise range, service ceiling, and initial climb rate. These variables are standardized
by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation so that the coefficient gives the change in the
outcome for a one standard deviation change in the corresponding plane characteristic.
Table 3 Government contracting and market structure
Postwar market
presence
(1)
(2)
(3)
Bomber
0.530
0.208
0.209
(0.095) (0.073)
(0.081)
Army and Navy
−0.023 0.047
0.036
(0.071) (0.038)
(0.044)
Air Mail
0.090
0.034
−0.018
(0.043) (0.030)
(0.083)
Holding company −0.084 −0.022
−0.018
(0.048) (0.045)
(0.058)
Capacity
−0.018
−0.011
(0.054)
(0.063)
Speed
0.259
0.303
(0.063)
(0.143)
Engines
0.088
(0.049)
Engine type
−0.048
(0.093)
Power
−0.109
(0.072)
Load
−0.035
(0.057)
Range
0.000
(0.071)
Service
0.012
(0.136)
Climb
−0.128
(0.094)
Observations
118
118
118
2
R
0.411
0.594
0.658

Notes: This table shows the results from estimating equation (2). The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a plane
had positive market share in the postwar period (1946–65). The results in col. 1 include indicators for whether a firm had
bomber, Army/Navy, or Air Mail contracts, or belonged to a holding company. Col. 2 adds controls for capacity and speed;

col. 3 includes additional controls for the no. of engines, engine type, power, load, range, service, and climb. See the notes
to tab. for a description of these variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for within‐firm as well as within‐year‐of‐
entry correlations of the residuals using multidimensional clustering.

In the absence of controls for plane characteristics in column 1, the coefficients on the indicators for bomber
and Air Mail contracts are positive and statistically significant. Interpretation of the coefficients’ magnitudes
suggest that bomber and Air Mail contracts increased the probability of a postwar market presence by 53 and 9
percentage points, respectively. The coefficients on 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 and ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗 are negative, although only the
latter is statistically significant. Across the specifications including controls for plane characteristics (columns 2
and 3), only the coefficients on speed and number of engines are statistically significant. When plane
characteristics are included, the magnitude of the coefficient on 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 is reduced by half, although it remains
economically large: bomber contracts increase the probability of a postwar market presence by almost 21
percentage points. In columns 2 and 3, the coefficients on the other aspects of government contracting are
closer to zero and are not statistically significant. Our analysis suggests that postwar survival was aided by the
production of large, military airframes as opposed to holding company affiliation or earlier manifestations of
government contracting.
The results in table use an indicator for presence in any postwar year up to 1965. To examine variation over
time, we re‐estimate equation (2) separately for each postwar year and plot the coefficients for the primary
variables of interest in figure .[37] The first panel shows the results for the coefficients on bomber contracts. The
results are consistent with a higher probability of survival in the commercial market throughout the early
postwar period. Note the decrease in the bomber coefficient (panel A) after 1960. This is due to consolidation in
the industry so that by the early 1960s most of the remaining airframe manufacturers had held contracts to
produce bombers during the Second World War.

Discussion
The shakeout model in section II makes clear that survival is more likely for firms that enter early relative to
those that enter late, but this effect can be partially offset through experience. Several shakeout episodes
support this theoretical result. Entrants with previous experience in the radio industry were more likely to
survive the television shakeout.[38] Likewise, entrants with previous experience in carriage, bicycle, or engine
markets were more likely to survive the automobile shakeout.[39] The commercial airframe shakeout provides
an additional interpretation of what it means to be an ‘experienced’ entrant.
We find that survival in the commercial airframe shakeout is explained not only by past experience in a related
industry, but by concurrent experience in a related industry, namely, the military airframe industry. We partially
concur with Sutton, who writes: ‘[T]he war years generated a major shock to the industry's structure. As the
exigencies of wartime enhanced production capabilities and design experience of all firms involved in military
aircraft, so it provided a window of opportunity for these firms to enter the manufacture of civil aircraft in the
postwar years’.[40] Our empirical results suggest that not all firms enjoyed this window of opportunity, but that
commercial airframe survival was specifically aided by producing large, military airframes for the Second World
War.

Figure 4. Government contracting and market structure, by year (a) Bomber. (b) Army/Navy. (c) Air Mail. (d) Holding
company.
Notes: Each panel of the figure plots the coefficient associated with each type of contract (panels A to C) and whether the
firm belonged to a holding company (panel D), for each postwar year (1946–65). The dependent variable is an indicator for
whether a plane had positive market share in the postwar period. All specifications included controls for plane
characteristics (as in col. 3 of tab. 3). The no. of observations is 118.

In affecting the course of the commercial airframe shakeout through contracts made in the military airframe
industry, the government's role in commercial airframes was less direct than in the penicillin industry where the
government hand‐picked 20 producers. Yet the government's role in shaping survival was crucial in both
industries. In the penicillin market, four of the 20 firms selected by the government to produce penicillin
accounted for 70 per cent of that industry's post‐shakeout sales. Likewise, three of the eight airframe firms with
heavy bomber contracts (Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed) accounted for 79 per cent of commercial plane sales
from 1955 to 1965.[41]
Government contracting directly affected survival in the penicillin industry; in commercial airframes, such
contracting indirectly affected survival via the military airframe market. The firms that acquired heavy bomber
contracts gained advantages in learning capacity.[42] While the jet engine was the product of government‐
funded R&D, only a few firms had the technological know‐how or learning capacity to incorporate this non‐
proprietary knowledge into a commercially viable jet airplane.[43] As Mowery and Rosenberg write: ‘After World
War II, the development of jet‐powered strategic bombers and tankers allowed airframe makers to apply
knowledge gained in military projects to commercial aircraft design, tooling, and production’.[44]
Our empirical results suggest that the advantages in learning capacity gained from bomber contracts were a
necessary, though not a sufficient, condition to survive the commercial airframe shakeout. Converting
technological advances in aviation from the military to the commercial realm was neither easy nor costless.
Rosenberg et al. estimate that under 60 per cent of aviation advances from the military market made their way
into the commercial market.[45] In 1948, Glenn L. Martin wrote of the difficulties of absorbing and applying

basic aeronautical research to specific commercial craft: ‘[D]ata as is made available from [publicly‐funded, basic
research]… cannot be put to immediate use by the aircraft designer. These data must be analyzed in relation to
the specific design project and then perhaps become the subject of further specific tests and study before their
usefulness can be fully realized’.[46]
The postwar experiences of Republic Aviation and the Curtiss‐Wright Corporation illustrate the difficulties that
firms faced in surviving in the commercial airframe market. Republic attempted entry into the commercial
market for the first time in the postwar period. Having converted surplus C‐54 transports into airliners for
American Airlines immediately following the war, the company attempted ex novo entry into the commercial
airframe market with its Rainbow plane.[47] By 1946, the number of engineers at Republic devoted to the
Rainbow project exceeded 420.[48] Though this team developed the fastest piston‐engine aircraft in our sample,
Republic scrapped the Rainbow project in early 1947.
Unlike Republic, Curtiss‐Wright had a storied history in the airframe industry as the merged product of its two
earliest entrants. During the 1940s, the firm increased its research staff and its R&D expenditures in line with its
competitors.[49] However, much of this research effort was directed at engines rather than airframes. As the
company's main source of profit, Curtiss‐Wright's management favoured the Wright engine division at the
expense of the Curtiss airframe division. More generally, the company's dividend payout ratio (dividends over
net profit) was three times that of Boeing and Douglas from 1946 to 1950.[50]
On the other hand, Boeing was so committed to airframe research that the company built its own wind tunnel in
1947, thereafter greatly aiding its competition with Douglas and Lockheed.[51] Donald Douglas, the founder of
Boeing's chief postwar competitor, indicates just how extensive his company's airframe R&D commitment was:
[E]xperience has repeatedly taught that no single experimental airplane or dozen experimental airplanes
are a sufficient number to eliminate the major bugs in the design and manufacture of new commercial
aircraft or aircraft of any advanced type. In the case of the DC‐6, despite great similarity to the Army's C‐
54 … the Douglas Company is continuing to spend vast sums to improve the airplane after approximately
eighty of them have been delivered … In the broad sense development costs never cease, only diminish
as production continues during the lifetime of an airplane model.[52]
In the commercial airframe shakeout, as our simulation results in section illustrate, experience mattered. In the
first decade after the Second World War, the ex novo commercial airframe entrants were Hughes, Republic,
Chase, Martin, and Britain's Vickers‐Armstrong. Martin and Vickers‐Armstrong were the only members of this
group to enjoy any postwar success. Not coincidentally, both companies designed bombers for the war; Martin
the B‐26 and Vickers the Wellington bomber in England.[53] For markets with government demand, or markets
closely related to those with government demand, we emphasize that for entrants, it is better to be early, best
to be experienced.

Conclusion
This article has used industry history to reinterpret a standard model of shakeout to incorporate government
demand, and has shown how this demand channel moulded commercial airframe market structure from the late
1920s to the early 1960s. Theoretical and empirical work on shakeout has emphasized how market forces
produce shifts in entry and exit that instigate evolution to oligopoly. In the automobile, tyre, and television
industries, this standard story fits. However, in other industries, such as commercial airframes, it lacks
explanatory power. Using newly digitized data on plane characteristics and market share for all commercial
airframe manufacturers from 1926 to 1965, we have highlighted the critical role of government demand through
Second World War‐era bomber contracts on the commercial airframe shakeout.

Our results show that government demand must be added to the standard shakeout story in the case of the
early commercial airframe industry. Recent evidence suggests that military production had a limited impact on
aggregate productivity growth in the immediate post‐Second World War period.[54] We have focused on the
postwar impact of military production on market structure—on who survived instead of how much was
produced—and have identified a large impact of government demand on firm survival. We found that large
bomber design and production permitted some airframe firms to gain relative advantages in R&D learning
capacity. Such learning capacity differentials then allowed a select group of manufacturers greater access to the
postwar commercial airframe market.
We have focused on the period from the origin of the commercial airframe market to the early days of jet
airliners. In subsequent years, Boeing acquired Douglas, and Lockheed exited the commercial airframe
market.[55] In addition, beginning in 1967, the British, French, and German governments subsidized Airbus, and
by the late 1980s the company was profitably competing with Boeing. Today, the commercial airframe market is
essentially a duopoly between Boeing and Airbus (along with smaller, commuter plane makers including
Bombardier and Embraer). We have argued that in the pre‐jet age, governments affected firm survival primarily
through indirect military airframe contracts. The 20‐year ascension of Airbus was the result of more direct
government involvement in the commercial airframe market.[56] So while the channels through which
governments affect the evolution of the commercial airframe market have changed over time, government
demand continues to shape the industry's market structure.
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PHOTO (COLOR): Stylized facts of the commercial airframe shakeout (a) Firms, entry, and exit. (b) No. of
passengers. (c) Market concentration. (d) New planes by usage. Notes: Panel A shows the no. of commercial
airframe firms (US and foreign), entrants, and exits on time. Panel B shows the no. of airline passengers in the
prewar period. Panel C shows commercial airframe market concentration on time. The vertical lines indicate the
release dates of major Douglas Aircraft planes. Panel D shows the moving average of new commercial planes,
both used and unused, on time. Source: Phillips, Technology and market structure; Aeronautical Chamber of
Commerce of America, Aircraft yearbook.
PHOTO (COLOR): Model simulation results (a) Baseline R&D learning capacity. (b) High R&D learning capacity.
Notes: Panel A graphs the average firm survival percentage in 100 computer simulations of Klepper on firm age.
The parameters used for panel A are used for the panel B simulations, except half of the ‘later entry cohort’ in
panel B have high R&D productivity as described in the text.
PHOTO (COLOR): Working capital, by holding company Notes: This figure shows working capital (current assets
minus current liabilities) from Dec. 1928 to Dec. 1933 for several major holding companies and one independent
firm, Douglas Aircraft. The holding companies were disbanded by the Air Mail Act in June 1934. The dashed
vertical line indicates the ‘Black Tuesday’ stock market crash of Oct. 1929. Source: Moody's Investors Service,
Moody's manual of industrials.

PHOTO (COLOR): Government contracting and market structure, by year (a) Bomber. (b) Army/Navy. (c) Air Mail.
(d) Holding company. Notes: Each panel of the figure plots the coefficient associated with each type of contract
(panels A to C) and whether the firm belonged to a holding company (panel D), for each postwar year (1946–65).
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a plane had positive market share in the postwar period. All
specifications included controls for plane characteristics (as in col. 3 of tab. ). The no. of observations is 118.
PHOTO (COLOR): Model simulation results (no cost spillovers) Notes: Panel A graphs the average firm survival
percentage in 100 computer simulations on firm age. The parameters used for panel A are used for the panel B
simulations, except half of the ‘later entry cohort’ have high R&D productivity. Whereas cost spillovers are
allowed in the simulations in fig. , such spillovers are prohibited here.
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